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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The Ford case illustrates a fact situation offering strong possibilities
of allowing the equitable principles of estoppel and recoupment to
govern. Although the former was not sufficiently established, the court
seems to have engaged in an independent analysis of recoupment, di-
vorcing its equitable foundation from the consequences of their deci-
sion. By stringently enforcing the "single transaction" requirement, in
effect the court permitted the plaintiffs to evade their estate tax liability
under circumstances which place a greater degree of fault upon their
executors than upon the Government. Chief Judge Jones in his dissent-
ing opinion expressed a sounder solution to the dilemma:
The correction is being made at the instance of plaintiffs. It
seems fair that as a condition to the change in valuation they
should be willing to surrender the advantage which had come to
them by reason of the undervaluation they are seeking to
change."2
7
This result would leave the parties in the financial position they would
have assumed by a correct valuation of the stock.
MICHAEL WHERRY
Torts-Negligence: Recovery for Traumatic Neurosis-Plain-
tiff, the driver of an automobile struck by defendant's car, received
a brain concussion during the collision and was thrown onto the
pavement. Regaining consciousness and observing defendant lying
on the pavement apparently dead, and bleeding, and his elderly
wife standing there helpless and confused, plaintiff became hysteri-
cal, commenced crying, shaking, and complained of a headache.
On appeal from an award to plaintiff for mental and physical in-
juries, the r&cord indicated that plaintiff had experienced a trau-
matic neurosis-an anxiety reaction precipitated by a trauma. A
psychiatrist testified that the brain concussion served as a "compe-
tent reducing cause" which weakened plaintiff's powers of repres-
sion. Plaintiff, having a repressed hatred for his father, associated
against her for past due estate income taxes. Her claim of recoupment was
granted on the grounds that the true net estate was greatly reduced by the
liability for income taxes in 1949. With regard to the single taxable event
theory, the court stated at 228 "The Government has received monies which
in equity and good conscience belong to the taxpayer. . . . It is true that in
the Bull case both claims grew out of the same transaction and were asserted
against the same money in the hands of the executor; but that in practical
effect, is the situation that prevails here. The Government has asserted two
claims against the monies of the estate that came into the hands of the ad-
ministratrix, one on account of past due income taxes, and the other on ac-
count of the estate tax due on the net estate, and it is impossible to determine
the amount of the latter without making due allowance for the deduction
caused by the former." Accord: Bowcutt v. U.S., 175 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mont.,
1959).
27 Supra note 9, at 23, 24.
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him with the defendant, and being in a weakened mental state, this
association "triggered" the reaction. The Court decided that the
plaintiff could recover only for the physical injuries resulting from
defendant's negligence. It reasoned that,
The testimony of Dr. Smith establishes that the neurosis did
not have its origin in the brain concussion, but was due to the
plaintiff having seen Bergeson immediately after the accident
lying on the pavement with his wife standing alongside. This
requires that the same rule of damages be applied as in the cases
in which recovery is allowed for emotional distress alone. Such
rule precludes recovery in an action grounded upon negligence
for emotional distress which is due to a pre-existing susceptibil-
ity to emotional disturbance not present in a normal individual,
unless the actor had prior knowledge of such susceptibility.'
No such knowledge having been shown, judgment for mental damages
was reversed, but the issue of physical damages was remanded for
further disposition. Mac Mahon v. Bergeson, 9 Wis. 2d 256, 101 N.W.
2d 63 (1959).2
The above quotation constitutes the entire reasoning of the Court
for denial of recovery.3 Being susceptible to conflicting interpretations,
the decision does not unequivocally express why plaintiff could not
recover for his mental injuries. In fact it gives rise to at least three
possible grounds for denial: 1. defendant was under no duty in the
first instance to foresee the likelihood of plaintiff's mental injuries, 2.
a duty did exist, but defendant's misfeasance was not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's illness, 3. defendant's negligent conduct was a sub-
stantial factor in producing plaintiff's illness, but as a matter of law,
recovery was denied on grounds of public policy.
The inference may be drawn that compensatory damages for mental
injuries was denied because defendant had no duty to protect plaintiff
I MacMahon v. Bergeson, 9 Wis. 2d 256, 272, 101 N.W. 2d 63, 71 (1959).
2 See, 64 A.L.R. 2d 100, 1959, for an alignment of the various jurisdictions in
the field of recovery for emotional disturbance.3 Supra note 1. The following authorities are cited, without discussion, in
support of the doctrine announced by the Court:RESTATEMENT, TORTS §313(1934); PRossER, TORTs §37, 179-80 (2d ed. 1955); Mc Niece, Psychic In-jury and Tort Liability in New York. 24 ST. JOHIN's L. REv. 1, 77 (1949) ;
Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VIRGINIA L. REv. 193, 282 (1944).
Restatement of Torts §313, entitled Emotional Distress Unintended, reads
as follows: (1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to
another, he is liable to the other for illness or bodily harm of which the dis-
tress is a legal cause if the actor: (a) should have realized that his conduct
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by
knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and (b) from facts known
to him should have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result
in illness or bodily harm. The following statement is found under comment
b; ". . . one who unintentionally but negligently subjects another to such an
emotional distress does not take the risk of any exceptional physical sensitive-
ness to emotion which the other may have unless the circumstances known
to the actor should appraise him thereof."
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from this type of harm. Before actionable negligence may be predi-
cated upon the conduct of the defendant, an existent duty must appear
combined with a co-existent breach thereof. A duty is said to arise
to protect others from a wrongful invasion of their rights when the
actor, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, should reason-
ably foresee that his conduct is likely to create an unreasonable risk
of harm to others. 4 Further, it is not necessary, for the actor's con-
duct to constitute negligence, that he foresee the particular type or de-
gree of injury, but only that he foresee the risk of some injury.5 If
this case holds that no duty arose to protect plaintiff from mental iri-
jury because the defendant could not anticipate that particular form of
resultant injury, then it would appear inconsistent with existing case
law. It is at least arguable that defendant's duty toward plaintiff's
emotional tranquillity was conditioned upon his ability to foresee the
occurrence of a particular type of injury to the libellant. With this
interpretation of the rationale in the Mac Mahon case, the rule is dia-
metrically opposed to the principles announced in Koehler v. Waukesha
Milk Co.6 and in Osborne v. Montgomnery.7
Recovery has been allowed for actionable negligence where a
plaintiff suffers combinations of physical and mental injuries,8 but
- Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
5 Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926). Accord,
Le Beau v. M.St.P. & S.S.R.Co., 164 Wis. 30, 159 N.W. 577 (1916); Crouse
v. C. & N.W.Co., 104 Wis. 473, 483, 80 N.W. 752, 755 (1899), "It is not neces-
sary to a recovery that the defendant should have foreseen the exact injury
shown. It is sufficient if the damage claimed legitimately flows directly from
the negligent act, whether such damages might have been foreseen by the
wrongdoer or not."; For the same reasoning in an intentional tort case cf.
Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 530, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (1891), ". . . the
wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act,
whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him."
6 Supra note 5.
7Supra note 4, at 236, 234 N.W. at 377, "This court ... [commenting on Koehler
v. Waukesha Milk Co.] adopted the rule that given a negligent act creating
liability, the extent of that liability is for all consequent damages naturally
following the injuries whether such resulting damages were reasonable to
be anticipated or not . . . . This leaves out the element of probability or
reasonable anticipation or foreseeability as a factor, operating to limit the
extent of the defendant's liability."
S E.g., Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909), where, in allow-
ing recovery for plaintiff's miscarriage due to severe fright, negligently oc-
casioned, the Court held that physical injury flowing directly from extreme
fright or shock is a link in the chain of proximate causation as efficient as
physical impact from which like results flow; Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co.,
197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928), where plaintiff recovered for hysterical
paralysis, suffered more than two-months after defendant's actionable negli-
gence, when she was frightened by the clanging-bell of a passing streetcar,
the Court held that there is no need of foreseeability of the particular in-jury as long as damage legitimately flows directly from the negligent act;
cf. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Klassa v.
Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W. 2d 397 (1955). For treat-
ment of this proposition in other jurisdictions see 64 A.L.R. 2d 100 (1959)
15 AM. JUR. DAMAGES §§176. 188 (1938).
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apparently not for pure mental injuries without some physical injuries.9
In the Mac Mahon case, the Court may be suggesting that even where
physical injuries accompany mental injuries, a duty may arise to pro-
tect plaintiff from physical injury, but not from mental injury; and
the controlling determinant is defendant's prior knowledge of plain-
tiff's mental peculiarities. Therefore, sufficient evidence to impose a
duty to protect another from mental injury, would necessarily require
affirmative answers to the following two questions: did the actor know
of the person's susceptibility to particular injuries, and did he foresee
that his conduct could cause that particular type of injury to that per-
son?
There is considerable support for the proposition that a defendant
who is negligent takes the plaintiff in the condition that he finds him,10
such as pregnancy, latent disease, susceptibility to disease, and weakened
physical or mental conditions." The Wisconsin Court gave tacit recog-
nition to this principle in Osborne v. Montgomery, where the Court
said:
If it be kept in mind that foreseeability under our law as it now
stands applies only to the question of negligence or the failure
to exercise ordinary care and not to limit the liability for the
consequences of the wrongful act, much confusion should be
done away with.'12
Thus, a holding that the defendant in the principal case should be re-
quired to foresee a particular injury to the plaintiff, just because he
was afflicted with a mental impairment, contravenes prior Wisconsin
case law. It may be difficult to say that the Court has now departed
from well-established principles controlling the "duty" element of
negligence, but such an interpretation is logical.
Assuming that the Mac Mahon decision was grounded upon proxi-
mate causation, a clear expression thereof does not appear. Causation,
as defined in the case of Pfieffer v. Standard Gateway Theaters, Inc.,
is as follows:
An instruction on proximate cause would be proper which in-
forms the jury that by proximate cause, legal cause, or cause...
is meant such efficient cause of the accident as to lead the jurors,
as reasonable men and women, to conclude that the negligence
of A (A having been found negligent . . .) was a substantial
factor in causing the injury. (Emphasis supplied by the court).'3
9E.g., Summerfield v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 87 Wis. 1, 57 N.W.
973 (1894), where recovery was denied for pure emotional injury allegedly
received because of defendant's negligent delay in transmitting a telegram
from plaintiff's dying mother; Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003
(1900), citing the Summerfield case with approval.
10 PRossR, TORTS §48, at 260 (2d ed. 1955).
"1 Infra note 20 for cases therein cited.
'12 Supra note 4 ,at 242, 234 N.W. at 379.
13 Pfieffer v. Standard Gateway Theaters, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 236, 55 N.W. 2d
1960-61]
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In the Mac Mahon case, the majority opinion agreed with the jury-
finding that Bergeson's negligence was a substantial factor in producing
plaintiff's physical injuries but disagreed with the triers of fact as to
any consequential mental damage. If this reasoning means that there
was no causal connection between defendant's negligence and plain-
tiff's mental injuries, in a legal sense, it would contradict the "substan-
tial factor" doctrine adopted in the Pfieffer case.
Recovery in the instant case was not sought on the grounds of insti-
tution of a neurosis but for the precipitation and aggravation of a pre-
existing condition peculiar to this plaintiff.14 This is quite a different
thing. "Medically, trauma is not considered the primary cause of such
a neurosis."' 15 A neurotic individual exists with mental imbalances that
have causal origins extending into the past.1 6
In the metaphysical sense, many factors concur to cause a given
event, and the same is true in the medical sense of causality. However,
a court is faced with the issue of who is legally responsible for plain-
tiff's alleged injuries. In the Mac Mahon case, without defendant's
negligence in the first instance, it is unlikely that plaintiff would have
suffered a traumatic neurosis.' 7  Nevertheless, as stated by the dis-
sentors, "it is clear that Bergeson's negligence caused plaintiff's ill-
ness."' 8 Hence, did the Wisconsin Court deny recovery because de-
fendant did not medically cause plaintiff's mental injuries?
In a traumatic neurosis suffered under such circumstances as
existed in this case, defendant's conduct,
29, 33 (1952). In reversing the earlier case of E. L. Chester Co. v. Wisconsin
Power & Light Co., 211 Wis. 158, 247 N.W. 861 (1933), the Court stated, at
240, 55 N.W. 2d at 34, "The effect of the decision in E. L. Chester .... [is
that] in the unusual or 'hard' case the inquiry as to reasonable anticipation
should be limited to the particular type of injury which actually occurred.
We no longer consider this to be the proper solution . . . . It would seem
to be preferable to submit these hard cases to the jury in so far as deter-
mining the issues of negligence and causation in the same manner as in the
ordinary case."
14 See, Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances as Legal Damlages, 20 MICH. L. REV.
497 (1921-22), for an excellent discussion of the relationships between physical
and mental injuries peculiar to the field of tort liability. See generally,
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. LAW REv. 1033 (1935-36).
15 STRECKER, PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (7th ed. 1951).
16 Lubitz, Traumatic Neurosis, 41 MAR L. REv. 421, 429 (1958).
17Supra note 1, at 267, 269, 101 N.W. 2d at 69, 70. On direct examination the
psychiatrist testified, in part, that ". . . in a traumatic neurosis we say that
there is a pre-existing emotional state or readiness for this neurosis, and it
takes some precipitating event to cause the neurosis to show itself." (All
italicized in original) . . . On cross examination he stated that, "Prior to the
accident his [plaintiff's] feelings about his father had been pushed down and
repressed. His powers of repression were weakened by the accident itself
and the mental trauma that he received at that particular time. The accident
weakened these powers of repression. After the powers of repression had
been weakened, he then saw Mr. and Mrs. Bergeson."
18 Supra note 1, at 273, 101 N.W. 2d at 73 (dissenting opinion).
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*. . may be responsible for the onset of an already existing im-
pairment. Medicine attributes the cause of this impairment to
emotional conflict antedating the trauma brought about by the
tortious conduct and considers the trauma merely a precipitating
factor of but a part of the course of the disorder.19
However, the concept of legal causation in fact, requires only that but
for the commission of the tort, the harm would not have been sustained
by the plaintiff. This requirement has meant such efficient cause as to
lead reasonable men to conclude that a defendant's conduct was a sub-
stantial factor in producing the injury:
: . . where. .. defendant's negligence has brought about bodily
injury through physical trauma or impact, the law freely allows
recovery for many kinds of emotional disturbances that result
from the injury. Such damages have amply been called 'para-
sitic.' They include fright, mental anguish, and the like, and also
suffering and disability caused by traumatic neurosis.20
Though the Court, in denying relief, adopted the view that Mac
Mahon's neurosis did not have its medical origin in the brain concus-
sion, (a finding substantiated by voluminous medical testimony), the
jury found that defendant's negligence was the legal cause-a substan-
tial factor-precipitating a chain of causal events that unwillingly
thrust plaintiff into a weakened mental state and created a combination
of unique circumstances that "triggered" the anxiety reaction. When
determining legal causality, the tort, and not the psychic injury is the
foundation of the cause of action. There is indication that the Court
failed to differentiate the medical cause of plaintiff's anxiety reaction
resulting from the actionable injury, and the legal cause creating the
actionable injury. It remains that defendant's negligent conduct pre-
cipitated the actionable injury.
A third possible interpretation of the rule announced in the Mac
Mahon decision is that the Court recognized defendant's duty and
legal causation, but denied recovery for plaintiff's mental injuries as a
matter of law, i.e. to avoid shocking the public conscience. If this was
19 Supra note 16, at 440.202 HARPER & JAMEs, ToRTS §18.4, at 1032 (1956). Where a complainant is not
an "ordinary" person, but has a pre-existing susceptibility to injury, this has
not prevented a finding of proximate causation in prior cases involving vari-
ous impairments. E.g., Pankopf v. Hinkley, supra note 8 (pregnancy) ; Brown
v. C.M.St.P.Ry.Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N.W. 356 (1882) (pregnancy); Sundquist
v. Madison Rys. Co., supra note 8 (hysterical paralysis) ; Colla v. Mandella,
infra note 23 (heart disease) ; McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y.
221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911) (alcoholic disease-delirium tremens); Flood v.
Smith, Brown v. Same, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A. 2d 677 (1940) (diseased thyroid
gland) (nervous disorder); Offensend v. Atlantic Refining Co., 322 Pa. 339,
185 A. 745 (1936) (tubercular infection), Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wright,
183 Ky. 634, 210 S.W. 184 (1919) (susceptible to creosote poisoning) ; Kenney
v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925) (unusual fear of mice-dead
mouse in soup).
1960-611
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the Court's reasoning, such position would find adequate support in
Wisconsin case law:
It is recognized by this and other courts that even where the
chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery against the
negligent tortfeasor may sometimes be denied on grounds of pub-
lic policy because the injury is too remote from the negligence
... or in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the
negligence should have brought about the harm, ... or be too
likely to open the way to fraudulent claims, or would enter a
field that has no sensible or just stopping point.21
The instant case falls "three-square" 22 onto the decision of Colla
v. Mandella,23 a recent case brought for plaintiff's wrongful death
flowing from fright-induced physical injuries. Colla, an elderly man
suffering from a mild heart condition, was napping on his bed when
defendant's runaway truck crashed into the wall adjacent to Colla's
bedroom. Plaintiff was severly frightened and died ten days later. In
awarding a new trial the Court held, that:
If Mandella was negligent in the premises, his negligence
was a proximate cause of Colla's damage and death. The chain
of causation was direct .... 24
The fact that a normal man in Colla's position without heart
trouble would have suffered no substantial injury, does not pre-
vent recovery.' 25
The Court decided that the aggravation of Colla's pre-existing physi-
cal impairment which made him susceptible to injury (where a "normal"
individual would receive nothing more than a good scare) ,26 constituted
a good cause of action. Moreover, to hold defendant liable for the
wrongful death would be a result not too remote to be unconscionable
and against public policy.
Juxtaposition of the Colla and Mac Mahon cases forms a tenuous,
but diametric distinction, viz. pre-existing physical subnormality op-
posed to pre-existing mental subnormality. The two cases cogently
suggest the distinction that where there is a pre-existing physical im-
21 Infra note 23, at 598, 85 N.W. 2d at 348. Accord, Waube v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935); Pfieffer v. Standard Gateway
Theaters, Inc., supra note 13, at 240, 55 N.W. 2d at 35; Klassa v. Milwaukee
Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 183, 77 N.W. 2d 397, 401 (1955) ; See generally,
Osborne v. Montgomery, supra note 4; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §435(2) (1948
Suppl.); PROSSER, TORTS §48, at 265 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, Palsgraff Re-
visited, 52 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1953-54).
22The essential difference is that in Colla v. Mandella, infra note 23, plaintiff's
pre-existing impairment was a subnormal physical condition.
23 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W. 2d 345, 64 A.L.R. 2d 95 (1957).
24 Id. at 597, 85 N.W. 2d at 347.
25 Id. at 600, 85 N.W. 2d at 349. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §461 (1934) ; PROSSER,
TORTS §48, at 260 (2d ed. 1955). supra note 10.
26 Id. at 596, 85 N.W. 2d at 347, "There was no evidence that the noise or shock
of the accident would have been likely to cause any harm to a person in normal
good health."
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pairment reparation will be allowed, but where there is a pre-existing
mental impairment reparation will be denied. That is to say, public
policy may sanction recovery in the former case, but proscribe recovery
in the latter.
The dissentors in Mac Mahon v. Bergeson held, inter alia, that the
instant case fell squarely within Colla v. Mandella, and that there were
no unusual grounds for denying recovery on the basis of public policy.2
They recognized that plaintiff's neurotic condition, per se, was due
to stresses in his background and did not have its primary medical
origin in the brain concussion. However, they contend that it should
have made no difference whether the plaintiff's subnormal response
was due to a physical or mental condition, and defendant's inno-
cense of any pre-existing condition should not have controlled recovery.
It was clear that plaintiff's physical and mental injuries were both
legally caused by defendant's misfeasance. Legal causation and lia-
bility did not suddenly stop with the brain concussion. Defendant's
actionable negligence ". . . made plaintiff vulnerable to an anxiety re-
action. . .,"28 by creating the circumstances that triggered his traumatic
neurosis. Moreover, it was uncontroverted that "... . plaintiff experi-
ences substantial suffering .... "29 Therefore, recovery should not have
been denied merely because it was plaintiff's misfortune to have had a
pre-existing mental impairment.
Notwithstanding the form of prior infirmity, the Mac Mahon case
should have been controlled by the established precedents followed in
Colla v. Mandela.30 Then if recovery was still to have been denied as
a matter of law, the grounds for reversal would have been public
policy-not any absence of defendant's "duty" or "legal causation."
This would have been in accord with prior Wisconsin case law.3 ' Fur-
thermore, if expressly stated as such, the real grounds for the decision
would not have been left to the inferences. The complete absence of any
case law supporting the decision invites the conclusion that prior case law
27Supra note 1, at 273, 101 N.W. 2d at 72 (dissenting opinion), "The majority
of the court rely upon the rule which would apply if plaintiff were a by-
stander whose emotional peculiarities were triggered by witnessing the injury
of people who chanced to resemble his parents." If the majority means that as
plaintiff observed the Bergesons at the accident-scene, he, at that time, was no
different than a mere bystander who happened to come along, such position
would have little support in the facts as presented.2 8 Supra note 27.
29 Ibid.
30 Supra note 23, at 599, 85 N.W. 2d at 348, "In such cases it is sometimes said
that the actor owed no 'duty' to the injured party; but that terminology has
been criticized as begging the question. The determination to deny liability
is essentially one of public policy rather than of duty or causation."3IE.g., Pfieffer v. Standard Gateway Theaters, Inc., supra note 13, at 240, 55
N.W. 2d at 34, "If the jury does determine that there was negligence, and that
such negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury, it is then
for the court to decide as a matter of law whether or not considerations of
public policy require that there be no liability."
1960-61]
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was inapplicable, and that Mac Mahon v. Bergeson constitutes "new"
law. Would this mean that recovery, within the field of ordinary negli-
gence, is dependent upon whether plaintiff's pre-existing impairment is
physical or mental? Does this case support the proposition that liability
may attach to defendant's ordinary negligence toward "physically"
subnormal plaintiff A, but "mentally" subnormal plaintiff B is damnum
absque injuria? "The utter relativity of the suggested norms would
seem to augur considerable uncertainty for future cases of this kind in
Wisconsin."3
FREDERIC N. SPIDELL
Practice: Option to Plaintiff to Take Reasonable Verdict as Al-
ternative to New Trial for Excessive Damages-Plaintiff, appellant,
was a passenger in one of two automobiles involved in an accident. The
jury found the drivers of both automobiles causally negligent and fixed
damages at $1,500 for pain and suffering and $5,000 for permanent in-
juries. The trial court found that there was not proper medical testi-
mony to support a finding of permanent injury and changed the jury's
answer to the question relating to permanent injury from "yes" to "no."
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for $1,500. The Supreme
Court, in Powers v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1 held that it was error on
the part of the trial court to change the jury's verdict and that there was
sufficient medical testimony to support a finding of permanent injury
but that the damages assessed were excessive. The Supreme Court then
stated:
Heretofore, in such a situation it has been customary to fix the
lowest amount an unprejudiced jury, properly instructed, might
award for damages, and then grant to the plaintiff the option of
taking such amount or having a new trial.2
The Supreme Court now adopts the rule that, "where an excessive
verdict is not due to perversity or prejudice, and is not the result of
error occurring during the course of the trial, the plaintiff should be
granted the option of remitting the excess over and above such sum as
the court shall determine is the reasonable amount of plaintiff's dam-
ages, or of having a new trial on the issue of damages."' 3 The court thus
overruled Heimlich v. Tabor4 and Campbell v. Sutliff- in so far as they
held that such a rule violated defendant's constitutional right to a trial
by jury. The court granted to the plaintiff the option of taking either
$3,000 for permanent injury or a new trial on the issue of damages.
32 GHIARDI, AIKEN & CORMAN, PERSONAL INJURY COMMIENTATOR, 1958 Annual,
ed. note p. 88.
1 10 Wis. 2d 78 (1960).
2 Id. at 87.3Id. at 91.
4 123 Wis. 525, 102 N.W. 10 (1905).
5 193 Wis. 307, 214 N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771 (1927).
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